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June, 1951
THE 1951 AMENDMENTS TO THE
RELINQUISHMENT AND ADOPTION LAWS
PHILIP B. GILLIAM
Judge of the Denver Juvenile and Family Court
Changes in the relinquishment and adoption laws of Colo-
rado were enacted by the 1951 General Assembly in response to
widespread demands by the public and child welfare organiza-
tions. Illegal relinquishments and a rising black market traffic in
babies throughout the country is cause for close scrutiny of the
safeguards provided in our laws against such abuses.
Colorado is one of the first states to put through curative
amendments, and our success was due in large part to broad non-
partisan support, and the recommendations received by the Ju-
venile Court from the State Home for Dependent Children, Catho-
lic Charities, Children's Aid Society, Child Welfare Division of
the Bureau of Public Welfare, the Jewish Child and Family Wel-
fare Service, and from various members of the Denver and Colo-
rado Bar Associations.
RELINQUISHMENTS-H. B. 219
House Bill No. 219, designed to put an end to the illegal
traffic of selling babies, or making changes in their custody out-
side of official channels, black market babies, was sponsored by
Representatives Wade and Carter, and Senators Gambill, Henry,
Cheever, Bennett and Davis.
Section 1 of H. B. 219 amends Section 3, Chapter 129, Ses-
sion Laws of 1949, the Jurisdiction and Venue section, by adding
a penalty for violation, making it a misdemeanor punishable by
fine or imprisonment, or both, for any relinquishment not in ac-
cordance with statutory provisions. Parents relinquishing a child
and persons receiving a child for adoption are covered by the
added language. Excluded from the new penalty provision are
those cases where the relinquishment is to "step-parents, grand-
parent or grandparents, uncle or aunt of said child." Any juvenile
or county court, other than a county court in a county wherein
a juvenile court is functioning, shall have jurisdiction of all re-
linquishment petitions.
The penalty clause reads:
Any person who shall violate the provisions of this section shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined a sum of money not exceeding Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00),
or imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months, or both such
fine and imprisonment.
ADOPTIONS-H. B. 220
House Bill No. 220, sponsored by Representatives Wade and
Pellett and Senators Bennett, Cheever and Davis, contains amend-
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ments to seven sections of Chapter 106, Session Laws of 1949.
Section 1, amending subsections (2) (b) and (2) (g) of
Section 6, Consent to Adoption, provides for an exception to the
necessity for obtaining consent to proposed adoption from both
natural parents in the case of a child born out of wedlock. An
additional exception to the necessity for obtaining consent of both
natural parents to proposed adoption is made in those cases,
where without cause, there has been failure to provide reasonable
support for a child for one year or more. It is now provided that
consent of the Superintendent of the State Home for Dependent
and Neglected Children will be proper consent for the adoption
of any child in the care, custody and control of the State Home
for Dependent and Neglected Children. This is an alternative
provision to consent by the Board of Control of such institution.
Section 2, amending subsection (1) of Section 7 of the 1949
law on Hearing and Examination, provides that where the child
has been in an adoption home under supervision of a duly li-
censed child placement agency, the State Home for Dependent and
Neglected Children, or any public welfare department, the court
may hear the petition for adoption forthwith and grant the adop-
tion decree (as formerly, this also pertains to a child who is a
grandchild or stepchild of one of the petitioners). Otherwise, a
30 day waiting period is required between filing of petition and
hearing of the adoption petition and examining of interested
parties.
Section 3, amending Section 8, Notice of Hearing, requires
notice of pending proceedings on adoption, in case of a child
not a grandchild or stepchild of petitioner or petitioners, to any
interested person or agency, unless such person or agency has
already consented, and adds the requirement of notice to the
adoptive child if over twelve years of age.
Subsections (1) (d) and (2) of Section 9, Hearing on the
Petition, are amended by Section 4. If, in the discretion of the
court, it will serve the best interests of the child, a forthwith
decree on the findings may be entered and a final decree of adop-
tion be granted. The former provision for an interlocutory de-
cree to become final at the end of one year is maintained in the
amended bill.
The wording under subsection (2) is changed to any wait-
ing period in place of the former such, to encompass the court's
discretionary powers regarding the forthwith or interlocutory
decrees. This change is also made under Section 5, amending Sec-
tion 10, Final Decree of Adoption.
A clause is added by Section 6, amending subsection (2) of
Section 11, Legal Effects of Final Decree of Adoption, protect-
ing the legal rights or obligations of the natural parent from be-
ing divested in those adoptions where the adopting parent is a
step-parent married to a natural parent.
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Under Section 7, amending Section 15, Records, adoption rec-
ords and papers will be considered confidential records of the court,
striking the former provision for sealing, and such records shall
not be open to public inspection unless by order of court. A pro-
vision also is added by this section that only one docket fee will
be assessed in cases involving more than one child.
THE RETAIL MOTOR VEHICLE INSTALLMENT
SALES ACT
LOUIS A. HELLERSTEIN
of the Denver Bar
By the enactment of the "Retail Motor Vehicle Installment
Sales Act"1 Colorado became the eleventh state to enact specific
legislation covering the installment sale of motor vehicles. The
act, which becomes effective on July 1, 1951, is restricted to install-
ment sales of such type of personal property. It does not affect nor
legislate upon cash sales nor does it affect installment retail sales
of any articles of personal property except motor vehicles as de-
fined in the act. Transactions other than retail sales are not af-
fected by the act.
The act covers those engaged in the sale of motor vehicles
upon the installment plan and financing institutions who purchase
or lend upon contracts resulting from such sales and make collec-
tion thereon such as banks, finance and loan companies. An in-
dividual selling his car is not affected by the act nor are those
banks or finance and loan companies who make loans upon the
collateral of such contracts or purchase such contracts, but who
do not (prior to default of the seller or borrower) collect the pay-
ments upon such contracts.
Motor vehicles generally as covered by the act are passenger
cars, trucks, station wagons and motorcycles. Road machinery,
tractors and agricultural machinery of a similar nature are ex-
cepted from the provisions of the act.
If a sale of a motor vehicle upon an installment basis is in-
volved the act applies even though the form of contract purports
to be a leasing or bailment when the bailee or lessee contracts to
pay as compensation for its use a sum substantially equivalent to
the value of the property and bailee or lessee is bound or has the
option of becoming the owner thereof.
A finance company or a bank which makes a direct loan to a
purchaser to finance the purchase of a motor vehicle is not subject
1 H.B. 332, approved April 12, 1951, Holland's Legislative Service, p. 448.
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